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Hannibal's Importance in the Second

the Romans came out, Hannibal brought out

Punic War

his infantry, numbering some 20,000, up in
one big line, while his cavalry, numbering
10,000, were split up on both sides of the line.

By Steve Nery

His slingers and pikemen, about 8,000
Rome eventually won the Second
Punic War, but not until after Hannibal
ravaged Italy for over a decade and won
many huge victories along the way. There is
no doubt that Hannibal was a great
Carthaginian general, at the very least. There
are many factors in war, though, such as the
battle terrain, the size of the armies, and the
competence of each army. The question then
must be asked: How much was the war
influenced by Hannibal himself?

By

examining him and other Carthaginian
commanders and their success, as well as the
conditions surrounding their battles, it can
hopefully be proved that Hannibal's role in
the war was a major reason for the
Carthaginians' success for many battles.
Unfortunately, his ineffective grand strategy
also led to the Carthaginians' loss of the war.
First let us examine Hannibal's
exploits. In the winter of 218 B.C., he routed
the Romans at the Battle of Trebbia. After
days of being encamped near each other, the
two forces met when the Romans were
drawn out of their camp by some Numidian
cavalry. Hannibal, having discovered that
the Romans never planned for an ambush in
open ground, dispatched his younger
brother Mago with a small force to surprise
the enemy from behind in the battle. When

strong, were located in front of his infantry
and cavalry. Tiberius Sempronius Longus,
the consul in charge of the Romans on that
day, brought out his three lines of infantry,
36,000 strong, and posted his 8,000 cavalry
on the sides. Longus was not an incompetent
man; he had won a small victory over
Hannibal shortly before, but was perhaps a
little too eager to follow it up.

He was

probably not quite as good of a commander
as Publius Cornelius Scipio, the other consul.
This battle took place on a flat and treeless
piece of land, so the terrain gave neither side
an advantage in this regard, although
Longus had 6,000 more men than Hannibal.
The battle initially began as a standoff, but
on the sides Hannibal's cavalry outflanked
the enemy's, as would be the case in most
battles.

After some heavy fighting, Mago

emerged with his 1,000 infantrymen and
1,000 cavalry and attacked the Romans from
behind. The Romans were routed, as only
10,000 men managed to escape from the
battlefield. Every aspect of this battle seems
to be equal, or even favor the Romans. The
terrain was suited for an even battle, and the
Romans held the strength in numbers. There
is no evidence either that the Carthaginians
were superior to the Romans in fighting
ability, as the battle was at a standstill until
Mago attacked.

In fact, the Romans who
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were still in marching order and without the

Hannibal's men, as they "hacked a passage

least chance to defend themselves, delivered

with the edge of the sword right through the

up to slaughter (Polybius 250)."

African center (Livy 82)." The only thing

15,000 Romans died in the valley and another

that won the battle for Hannibal this day was

10,000 were captured, while Hannibal's

his brilliant decision to somehow hide a

losses amounted to no more than 2,500. The

contingent of his troops in an open field.

deck was stacked in Hannibal's favor here, as

escaped

actually fought better

About

Hannibal's next great victory came at

he chose a favorable spot for battle, and

Trasimene the following summer. This time

probably had more men than the Romans,

he faced the consul Gaius Flaminius, who

with his new Gallic allies. He must still be

was not

commended for realizing that the opposing

the military equal of his
Hannibal knew this and

commander was brash and hungry for battle,

realized that Flaminius would give him

and for plotting another ambush to produce

plenty of opportunities for a pitched battle.

yet another massacre. While Flaminius was

Livy praises Hannibal for this, calling his

foolish to fall into the trap, Hannibal was

reasoning "both far sighted and strategically

wise for knowing that he would.

sound" and claiming, "there is no more

His last and most

predecessors.

impressive

precious asset for a general than a

complete route came at Cannae in the

knowledge of his opponent's guiding

summer of 216 B.C. The Romans, led by the

principles and character (Livy 247)."

cocky Gaius Terentius Varro and the wiser

Hannibal therefore led his men into a

Lucius Aemilius Paullus, had a massive force

favorable place for a battle. He marched

of 80,000 infantry, and over 6,000 cavalry.

through a valley, with Lake Trasimene on his

Hannibal, by contrast, had about 40,000 men,

right, and hills on his left. As Flaminius

and 10,000 cavalry. Never afraid to sacrifice

followed him, he sent the slingers and

his allies, Hannibal put the Celts in the front

pikemen, as well as the Celts and his cavalry

lines, in an arched formation, so that the

under cover of the hills during one night.

center of the first line was closer to the

Flaminius pitched his camp next to the lake,

Romans than the sides were. The two armies

not far from Hannibal's, just as was expected

clashed on even ground, and Hannibal's

from him. At the first sign of dawn the next

cavalry almost completely destroyed Varro's.

day, Flaminius marched his troops into

Meanwhile, the Romans defeated the thin

battle. Once the Romans engaged Hannibal's

first line and poured through the Celtic and

contingent, his troops lying in ambush

Spanish center, and rushed triumphantly

rushed at the Romans and fell upon them

towards the Carthaginians.

from every side at once. "In consequence,

came through so heavily that "they then had

most of the troops were cut down while they

both contingents of the African heavy

The Romans
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infantry on their flanks (Polybius 272)." The

speed, and retreated. Hannibal subsequently

Carthaginian sides both turned inward and

"brought both his army and his plunder

surrounded the Romans. "The result was

safely through the gorge (Polybius 260)," and

exactly what Hannibal had planned: the

even rescued 1,000 of his men who had been

Romans, by pressing too far ahead in pursuit

taken hostages.

of the Celts were trapped between the two

thinking, Hannibal had managed to escape

divisions of Africans (Polybius 272)."

from a position in which the Romans thought

Complete massacre ensued. About 10,000

they had the possibility to end his campaign.

Because of his quick

Romans were captured, and nearly all the

Even in defeat, Hannibal was still an

rest, including the consul Paullus, were

amazing commander. Although his army

killed. Hannibal lost at the most 6,000 men.

was routed at Zama by Publius Cornelius

This was the worst defeat in Roman history

Scipio the younger when he was recalled to

to this point. Although the Roman army was

Africa, Hannibal still apparently drew up an

inexperienced and one of its generals was

ingenious

incompetent, it still had a great advantage in

spontaneous, he formed his ranks in the

numbers. It was through Hannibal's sacrifice

Roman fashion, in three distinct lines. He

of his allies that he managed to surround and

placed his elephants in the very front, to try

route the Romans. Again, his leadership

to cause commotion in the Roman ranks, and

must be praised.

make them lose formation. Unfortunately for

battle formation.

Always

Hannibal had a knack for short-term

him, the elephants were ineffective, as Scipio

strategies away from battle as well. After the

drew his ranks up with gaps in between

Battle of Trasimene and before the Battle of

maniples so that the elephants would charge

Cannae, eventual war hero Quintus Fabius

right through. Not only that, but as modern

Maximus,

historian

the

"Cunctator," followed

Brian Caven iterates,
were

in

Hannibal around and had him trapped at a

elephants

passage in the mountains. Recognizing that

inadequately trained (Caven 251)." On the

he was in an unfavorable position, and that

flanks, Hannibal placed his cavalry to

his army would most likely lose a battle

contend with the Romans', but he did not

there, Hannibal fooled the Romans that

have the great cavalry upon which he

night. Fabius had posted 4,000 of his men in

typically relied to outflank the enemies.

a pass so as to prevent Hannibal from

Behind the elephants Hannibal placed the

escaping. Once darkness set in, Hannibal

auxiliaries,

had his men tie sticks to 2,000 cattle, light

mercenaries. These men were placed at the

then, and drive them up the gorge. The

front to wound the Romans and cause

Romans mistook the cattle for a large

disorder, so that his veterans (who were in

Carthaginian force coming at them at full

the second line) could then move up and

including

all

"The

probability

thousands

of
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crush the Romans. They were also at the

Scipio as well as of all the military experts, he

front to prevent them from running away, as

achieved the distinction of having drawn up

these men had no loyalty to Carthage. This

his line on that day with remarkable skill

too failed, though not by Hannibal's fault.

(663)." Polybius and even modern historians

Livy claims that the mercenaries ran away

seem to agree with this assessment.

and were forced to fight the Carthaginians in

Based on his defeat, it is safe to

order to make a retreat, while Polybius

conclude that not even Hannibal's genius

blames the Carthaginians for not supporting

could overcome the incompetence of his

the mercenaries. In all probability, Livy is

army, especially up against as formidable an

correct, as Hannibal's trusted veterans never

adversary as Scipio. While Hannibal had

showed any signs of cowardice in previous

routed the Roman army thrice before, and

battles, and the mercenaries were more

won several other smaller battles, Caven

concerned about getting paid than about

describes what it was he was lacking at Zama

defeating the Romans. Hannibal had no

that his own genius could not make up for:

reason to foresee that the mercenaries would

But at Zama, Hannibal had not

have to make a path through his own men by

encountered a Longus or a Varro or a

blood; he probably presumed that they

Fulvius; his elephants were not the

would simply drop back and get out of the

noble beasts that had crossed the

way as the Roman velites commonly did.

Pyrenees, the Rhone and the Alps;

Had the mercenaries done their job, the

his cavalry, inferior in number, had

veterans could have come up and faced a

apparently no Hasdrubal, Hanno or

weakened Roman line. The third line was

Maharbal to lead them; his Balaerie

composed of his Italian contingent, of whose

slingers and Moroccan bowmen

loyalty he was unsure. They were therefore

were of little use in hand-to-hand

placed some distance back, as to prevent a

fighting and in retreat; and his

problem.

This tactic had already worked

second line, which might have done

before for Hannibal, such as when he was

useful work if the mercenaries had

crossing the Alps with some Gauls.

He

succeeded in driving back the enemy

placed the Gauls at the rear of his line, by his

in disorder, were not the stuff to

best troops, so that an attack by them would

stem an advance that was carrying

not prove disastrous. More could not have

all before it (253).

been asked from Hannibal, with the army

If Hannibal had the army that he took with

that he had available. Livy writes, "He had

him into Italy at the beginning of the war, his

tried everything he could both before and

strategy at Zama should have worked.

during the engagement before he withdrew

Instead he was left with only one competent

from the battle, and on the admission even of

line, that of his veterans, and they were much
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older and less numerous than they were at

that they were protected both by a river and

Cannae. In all likelihood, no commander

a steep ridge in front of them. "Scipio when

could have defeated Hannibal when he had a

he came up was eager to give battle, but felt

strong army. As we shall see, though, it was

uncertain as to how to proceed when he saw

his own fault that he did not have a

what a strong and advantageous position the

competent army raised and ready for the

enemy had chose (Polybius 421)." He finally

battle.

decided to attack, though, alarmed at the
Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, was

possibility of Hasdrubal meeting up with

another Carthaginian commander, but he did

Mago or another Carthaginian general.

not enjoy nearly the same kind of success

Scipio sent his best men up the ridge to

that Hannibal did. His failure should help to

attack the Carthaginian covering force. At

dispel any theories about all of the Barcas

this point, Hasdrubal initially did not make

being great generals, or of the Carthaginians

any move, until he saw that his men were

simply being better fighters than the

suffering heavy losses. When this occurred,

Romans, and should help show Hannibal's

he led his men out to the brow of the hill,

unique talent.

trusting the strength in their position rather

Again, there are several

factors that must be examined to see how

than any strategy.

Scipio sent his light-

much of an impact Hasrubal had in his

armed troops up the hill, and took half of his

defeats, but it should be clear that many of

army with him to attack the Carthaginians

his conditions were close to Hannibal's, yet

from the left flank.

he could not succeed on the same level as

leading some of his troops out of camp, as he

Hannibal.

had not responded early enough to the

Hasdrubal was still

Hasdrubal was stationed in Spain in

attack. "Up to this moment he had waited

the year 210 B.C., and Scipio was also in that

there, trusting to the natural strength of his

area, trying to win the Spaniards over as

position and feeling confident that then

allies. Hasdrubal was in command of a force

enemy would never venture to attack him,

of about 30,000 Carthaginians and Spaniards,

and so because the flank assault took him by

whom Hannibal had left him in charge of

surprise, he was too late in deploying his

before crossing the Alps several years before.

troops (Polybius 421)."

Scipio's force also included a large

saw that he was losing the battle, he escaped

contingent of Spaniards, whom Hasdrubal

with about 10,000 men. Scipio did not follow

had previously defeated. The two armies

him to route the remaining force, for fear of

met each other near the town of Baecula after

running into another Carthaginian general.

having been wary of each other for some

This was still a grand success for Scipio,

time. When Hasdrubal learned of Scipio's

though, as he had managed to defeat an

arrival near him, he positioned his men so

army which should have been able to easily

When Hasdrubal
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hold their position if they had only been

side of the lines, Hasdrubal and Nero (the

ready. The blame for this loss must fall on

other consul) clashed. "There, in that sector,

Hasdrubal's shoulders, as he had not

were the two commanders-in-chief, the

prepared his troops for battle, even when he

greater part of the Roman foot and Roman

saw a part of the Roman force climb the ridge

horse; there were the veteran Spaniards, wise

to attack his light armed troops. He had

in the ways of Roman warfare, and the tough

instead acted too confidently, and did not

fighters of Liguria (Livy 492)." Nero was

realize that the small force climbing the ridge

unable to get directly through Hasdrubal's

was simply a diversion. While Scipio's men

men, so he detached part of his forced and

were experienced from conquering Spain,

sent them around the side.

Hasdrubal's men were part of the force that

Hasdrubal did not adequately defend for an

had initially conquered Spain for Carthage

attack to the side, and he was outflanked.

some years before. With a division of the

Nearly all of his army was killed, including

same genre of men, Hannibal had enjoyed

himself. Polybius and Livy praise him for his

great success

in Italy to this point.

fighting prowess and bravery, as Livy claims,

Hasdrubal had managed to blow this battle

"There, still fighting, he found a death

despite his advantage in position and his

worthy of his father Hamilcar and his

army of veterans.

brother Hannibal (Livy 493)."

Once again,

While

Hasdrubal and the men that he

Hasdrubal had done everything that he

escaped with then proceeded to cross the

could do as a soldier, he was simply not

Alps, in a much more successful manner

nearly as gifted

than Hannibal had. The Romans sent the

commanding troops. Caven eulogizes him

consul Marcus Livius Salinator to face

this way: "A man of very ordinary ability as

Hasdrubal in northern Italy.

Livius was

a strategist and tactician, he would seem to

reinforced with 7,000 of the other consul's

have had some administrative capacity but

men, to help him win this battle. According

hardly a spark of the genius or a scrap of the

to Livy, when Hasdrubal saw that both

personal magnetism that made Hannibal

consuls were present on that day, he thought

almost unique (Caven 215)." In contrast to

that they might have already defeated

his brother, we see that Hannibal enjoyed far

Hannibal.

Accordingly, he determined to

greater success with the same breed

fight this battle to the last man. He had an

Carthaginians whom Hasdrubal was in

army composed of skilled fighters from

charge of, as both of their armies were

Spain, a large number of Gauls, and some

instrumental in victories in Spain before the

Ligurians. Hasdrubal drew his formation up

Second Punic War even started. Therefore it

so that it was deeper than it was wide, which

would be foolish to stereotype all of the

made it easier to attack its sides. On the right

Carthaginian generals, or even just the

as his brother at
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Barcas as being superior breed of leaders. It

and when Hasdrubal tried to join him.

would also not give Hannibal due credit to

According to the ancient sources, though,

claim that the Carthaginians were just a good

Hannibal could have been reinforced more if

fighting people. Indeed, it took a genius of

he wanted to. "Polybius stresses that it was

Hannibal's caliber to come up with strategies

Hannibal who all these years held the

to defeat Roman armies that were larger than

threads to all theatres of war and diplomacy

his own.

in his own hands. Thus it was Hannibal who

As skilled as Hannibal was at

allowed

himself

to

do

without

commanding his troops in battle, he failed in

reinforcements for years on end (Hoyos

several other exploits necessary to wage a

175)." It is interesting to note that thousands

successful war. One of these failures came

of forces were sent to Spain and Sicily during

before the war even began. In crossing the

the war, places that were not nearly as

Alps, he lost over half of his men, and many

crucial as Hannibal's position in Italy.

of his pack animals. As B.D. Hoyos writes,

Perhaps Hannibal was too cocky to think he

"This had not been inevitable.

As the

needed more troops, or perhaps he did not

Carthaginians well knew, many Gallic

wish to ask Carthage for more men, as this

peoples had migrated (with

wagons,

was basically a war that he started with his

families, and animals) across the Alps in both

own actions in Spain. Either way, his failure

directions and without disaster, just as a

to get more men limited his ability to defend

decade later Hannibal's brother would bring

all his allies in the Italian peninsula and

a new army through in good shape (Hoyos

certainly restricted any possibility of a march

173)." Granted, neither the Gallic tribes nor

on the city of Rome itself. This failure also

Hasdrubal took as large of a force over the

prevented him from maintaining a strong

mountain range, but Hannibal could have

army, with which he may have been able to

averted disaster if he had timed

defeat Scipio in Africa.

his

campaign better. Had he crossed the Alps

There was much speculation by the

either before or after the bitter mountain

ancient sources that Hannibal missed his

winter, he may well have been able to bring

chance to win the war when he did not

fifty to sixty thousand men to Italy in good

march on Rome after the battle of Cannae.

shape. With this large of a force, as well as

According

his Gallic allies, things may have turned out

commander of the Carthaginian cavalry,

different.

wished to make the march for Rome, and

to

legend, Maharbal, the

Another flaw in his strategy lies in

Hannibal refused. Livy quotes Maharbal as

his failure to get reinforced. Carthage did

saying, "You know, Hannibal, how to win a

seek at times to give him fresh troops, as

fight; you do not know how to use your

when he received 4,000 new men in 215 B.C.,

victory (Livy 151)." Livy goes on to claim,
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"It is generally believed that that day's delay

acquire the men to defend all of his allies in

was the salvation of the City and of the

Italy, nor could he count on them all

Empire (Livy 151)." Most modern sources do

remaining loyal. Only by keeping the energy

not believe that Hannibal's refusal to march

he generated at Cannae constant could he

was actually the salvation of Rome, as

have counted on keeping his allies.

Hannibal was not skilled at siege warfare

slowing the war down after the battle, this

and perhaps would not have been able to

possibility was lost.

By

Hannibal may also have

It is safe to conclude that Carthage's

expected the Romans to negotiate a treaty to

initial success in the Second Punic War was

end the war, as was common after a crushing

because of Hannibal's brilliance as a leader.

defeat in those days. The fact still remains

With a good army at his service, nobody in

that in order to win this war, Hannibal

his time was his equal. His remarkable skill

would have needed to take the city of Rome

was not enough to make up for an

itself, whether he knew it at the time or not.

incompetent army, though, such as the one

Hoyos claims that Maharbal's idea was a

he commanded at the Battle of Zama. He

good one, as he wanted to press on with his

was also not the best at making up a grand

cavalry and take the city by surprise (177).

strategy. Although his idea of winning over

This may well have worked, as the city

allies in Italy seemed like a good one, as it

would most likely have been in a great deal

would get him more troops, it also meant

of panic after the loss of so many men in the

that he had to spread himself too thin all

battle, including one consul and eighty

their cities. Eventually, he was not able to

senators. There is also the matter that the

defend any of them.

Romans did not have a skilled veteran army

maintaining a good army, although he had

to defend the city either. Whether or not

the opportunity to do so. Therefore his role

Hannibal could have taken the city cannot be

in the war can be assessed thus: his strategies

proclaimed for sure, but if there was one

were what won several huge victories over

time in the war in which he had a good

the Romans at the beginning (and lesser

chance at it, this was that time.

victories later on, as the Romans refused to

take the city.

He also failed at

It seems that with Hannibal's grand

fight any more huge pitched battles), but his

strategy for the war, he should have taken

flawed grand strategy also helped lead to

the chance of attacking Rome and ending the

Carthage's defeat in the end.

war in a single battle.

After the Romans

declined to negotiate following their loss at
Cannae, he must have known how hard the

Works Cited

Romans were determined to fight. He could

Caven, Brian. The Punic Wars. New York:

not win a long drawn-out war, for he did not

St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Ephemeris
Hoyos, B.D. "Hannibal: What Kind of
Genius?" Greece and Rome, Vol. XXX, No. 2,
Oct. 1983. pp. 171-179.
Livy. The War With Hannibal. New York:
Penguin Books, 1972.
Polybius. The Rise of the Roman Empire.
New York: Penguin Books, 1979.

Mosaic
By Christopher Bungard

31

